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Mining Gold in a Conflict Zone: The Context, 
Ramifications, and Lessons of AngloGold 
Ashanti’s Activities in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
Brandon Prosansky* 
“We mine gold.  We sell gold.  That’s what we do.”1    - Steve Lenahan, 
Executive Officer for Corporate Affairs, AngloGold Ashanti 
 “We are cursed because of our gold.  All we do is suffer.  There is no 
benefit to us.”2    - Congolese gold miner 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 In 2003, AngloGold Ashanti (AGA), a gold-mining company based in South 
Africa, started to lay the groundwork under which it would be able to commence gold-
mining exploration activities in Mongbwalu, a city in the northeastern Ituri District of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  At the same time, the Nationa list and 
Integrationist Front (FNI), an armed faction vying for power in the Ituri area, was 
engaged in a campaign of grave human rights abuses against the local Congolese 
population.  Inevitably, the paths of these two organizations crossed.  AngloGold Ashanti 
claims that any contacts with the FNI were unavoidable.  The FNI claims that AGA could 
not do business in Ituri without working with the FNI.  To some extent, AGA may be 
involved in human rights abuses through its link with the FNI.   
¶2 AngloGold Ashanti posted $2.629 billion of gold income in 2005.3  The DRC’s 
2005 GDP was seven billion dollars.4  To say that AGA is a powerful entity amid the 
African continent is an understatement, and AGA certainly influences the enjoyment of 
                                                 
* 2007 J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law; B.S. in Business, summa cum laude in 
Finance, A.B., summa cum laude in Diplomacy and Foreign Affairs, Miami University, 2001.  I would like 
to thank Professor Stephen Sawyer and Annie Wallis for their valuable and insightful advice and 
comments.  I would also like to thank my consistently supportive family and friends, and Sarah Schwartz 
and her family for their continued interest in this topic. 
1 Interview with Steve Lenahan, Executive Officer for Corporate Affairs, AngloGold Ashanti, in 
Johannesburg, South Africa (Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter Interview with Steve Lenahan] (discussing 
AngloGold Ashanti’s activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 
2 Hum. Rts. Watch, The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of the Congo , 1 (2005) (written by Anneke 
Van Woudenberg).  All subsequent citations to this report refer to the text version of the report, with no 
pictures, available at  http://hrw.org/reports/2005/drc0505/drc0505text.pdf. 
3 ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI, 2005 SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT  16 (2006) available at 
http://www.anglogold.com/subwebs/InformationForInvestors/AnnualReport05/report/pdf/Summary_report
_2005.pdf. 
4 David McKay, DRC Miners in for “Peace Rerating”, MININGMX.COM, Feb. 11, 2006, 
http://www.miningmx.com/events/zambia2006/893782.htm. 
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internationally recognized human rights by many on the African continent through its 
gold mining and exploration activities, from providing employment to improving 
infrastructure.5  AGA justifies its decision to operate in the DRC by claiming that its 
operations will provide economic growth to help transform the country. 6  The company 
claims it consulted extensively with the DRC government and the United Nations (UN) 
before deciding to operate in Ituri, but that conditions suddenly became non-conducive to 
normal business.7  Companies should not be punished for lawfully investing in “bad” 
countries or with “bad” people, nor should they have to guess which countries are “so bad 
as to warrant complete disengagement.”8  Further, international law has historically failed 
to “articulate the human rights obligations of corporations and to provide mechanisms for 
regulating corporate conduct in the field of human rights.”9  At the same time, the field of 
corporate complicity law is emerging, and moral questions may be as important as legal 
questions.10  The international community continues to debate whether businesses should 
operate in conflict zones.11  Companies in the extractive industries may be in a 
particularly unique situation, since, at least in the preliminary analysis, geography, rather 
than strategic company decisions, dictate the location of their operating sites.12  However, 
on a deeper level of analysis, companies may choose not to operate in conflict zones.  
AGA’s activities in the DRC, which seek to profit in a conflict zone marked by grave 
human rights abuses, are thus suspect; whether those activities violate international law 
or international obligations is a more complex question. 
¶3 AngloGold Ashanti’s potential involvement in human rights abuses fits into the 
larger context of the link between natural resource exploitation and continuing conflict 
that results in human rights abuses, especially in Africa.  Several interested parties, 
including the Congolese government,13 the UN,14 and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs),15 have attempted to address these issues and inform the public.  The Berlin 
                                                 
5 See SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUM. RTS. LITIGATION 1 (2004). 
6 Brendan Ryan, AngloGold Pays Price of First Mover Advantage, MININGMX.COM, June 1, 2005, 
http://www.miningmx.com/commentary/445678.htm. 
7 Id. 
8 JOSEPH, supra  note 5, at 52-53. 
9 Ronen Schamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested Concept of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 635, 637 (2004) (quoting Corporate Liability for 
Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2030 (2001)). 
10 Irene Khan, Sec’y-Gen., Amnesty Int’l., Understanding Corporate Complicity: Extending the Notion 
Beyond Existing Laws, Address at the Business Human Rights Seminar, Dec. 8, 2005, AI Index 
POL/34/001/2006, Mar. 21, 2006. 
11 World Bank Inst. & U. Mich. Bus. Sch., E-Conference on Business, Peace, and Democracy, 7 (Oct. 7 - 
Nov. 1, 2002) (edited by Djordjija Petkoski and Timothy L. Fort), available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/57522/bdp_econference.pdf. 
12 Id. 
13 See REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE COMMISSION SPECIALE CHARGEE 
DE L'EXAMEN DE LA VALIDITE DES CONVENTIONS A CARACTERE ECONOMIQUE ET FINANCIER CONCLUES 
PENDANT LES GUERRES DE 1996-1997 ET DE 1998, RAPPORT DES TRAVEUX (2005), available at  
http://www.kongo-kinshasa.de/dokumente/regierung/rapport_lutundula.pdf [hereinafter RAPPORT DE 
L’ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE]. 
14 See Reports of the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2001/357 (April 12, 2001), U.N. 
Doc.  S/2002/565 (May 22, 2002), U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 (October 16, 2002), U.N. Doc. S/2003/1027 
(October 23, 2003). 
15 See Fatal Transactions, DRC’s Natural Treasures: Source of Conflict or Key to Development (2005) 
(written by Saskia Van Hoyweghen), available at http://www.fataltransactions.org/DRC-
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Declaration 2005, promulgated by civil society organizations from several countries, 
including Australia, Canada, Germany, and the United States (US), to stop irresponsible 
gold mining, calls on “governments and mining companies to respect human rights and to 
stop ongoing human rights violations” through various means, such as taking legal action 
under criminal law and ensuring adequate compensation of the victims of human rights 
violations.16  Additionally, other concerned NGOs have staged campaigns against the use 
of “dirty gold,” primarily since eighty percent of the world’s mined gold is used in 
jewelry as a high end luxury item. 17  For example, Earthworks and Oxfam have jointly 
campaigned against dirty gold via the website, www.nodirtygold.org.18  The No Dirty 
Gold Campaign supports the rights of local communities “to determine their own futures 
- not to have it [sic] decided for them by corporations.”19  
¶4 Whatever the status of the relationship between AngloGold Ashanti and the FNI, 
one unanswered question is whether the international community can hold AGA 
accountable if the company was involved in human rights violations related to gold 
mining in the Ituri District of the DRC.  This paper will examine the various theories 
upon which liability might potentially rest to hold a company accountable for suspect acts 
within a conflict zone.  Part I provides details concerning the link between political 
developments in the DRC, gold-mining in the northeast region, and human rights abuses.  
Part II documents the activities of AngloGold Ashanti in the Ituri District of the DRC and 
presents the company’s record of corporate social responsibility.  Part III explains 
relevant international and industry norms related to corporate responsibility and 
accountability for human rights violations, and analyzes whether AngloGold Ashanti’s 
activities in the Ituri District comply with these norms.  Part IV considers the availability 
of legal remedies, including criminal prosecution and civil approaches.  Part V suggests 
alternative approaches to addressing the issue of corporate involvement in human rights 
abuses.  
II. GOLD MINING, WAR, AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE ITURI DISTRICT OF THE 
DRC 
A. Brief History of Gold Mining in the Ituri Area 
¶5 Prospectors first discovered gold in the northeastern Congo in 1903.20  At that time 
the area belonged to Belgian King Leopold II as his personal possession, and the country 
was known as the Congo Free State.21  During the first half of the twentieth century, 
                                                                                                                                                 
conference/DRC_Conference_report_FINAL_english.pdf. 
16 Berlin Declaration 2005 – Stop Irresponsible Gold Mining, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/2005/0918berlin.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
17 Jane Perlez & Kirk Johnson, Behind Gold’s Glitter: Torn Lands and Pointed Questions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 24, 2005. 
18 See No Dirty Gold Campaign Home Page, http://www.nodirtygold.org/about_us.cfm (last visited Apr. 
13, 2007). 
19 Id. 
20 Hum. Rts. Watch, supra  note 2, at 13.  
21 U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of Afr. Affairs, Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Jan. 
2006, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm.  However, the people of the Congo Free State were  
anything but free.  “While [King] Leopold [II of Beligum] grandly issued edicts banning the slave trade, 
virtually no visitors . . . stated the obvious; not only the porters but even the soldiers of the Force Publique 
were, in effect, slaves.”  ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST , 129 (1998). 
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colonial entrepreneurs exploited gold through private companies that introduced large-
scale or industrial mining.22   
¶6 The Congo’s independence in 1960 brought with it the nationalization of mining 
companies.23  The new Congo leadership renamed the country the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC).24  The new parliament elected Patrice Lumumba as prime minister 
in the first year of independence.25  However, his leadership did not last long.  In 1965, 
Lt. General Joseph Mobutu, commander in chief of the national army, seized and 
centralized power.26  The next year, the state granted the gold mining concession in the 
Ituri District of the Orientale Province to the new state-owned Office of the Gold Mines 
of Kilo-Moto (OKIMO).27  This concession is one of the largest unexplored gold reserves 
in Africa.28 
¶7 Mobutu centralized power during the 1970s, and in a campaign of cultural 
awareness, changed the country’s name to the Republic of Zaire.29  Mobutu enforced a 
system of one-party rule during the 1980s.  The early 1990s saw increased international 
criticism of the Mobutu regime’s human rights practices.30  During the early 1990s, 
OKIMO granted licenses to both multinational corporations (MNCs) using industrial 
methods and to local miners using artisanal methods.31  Generally, artisanal mining in the 
DRC is characterized as very labor intensive mining in dangerous and unhealthy 
conditions.32  Much of the small-scale mining is “done by hand, with broken shovels, 
plastic buckets and homemade hammers.”33 
B. Wars in the Congo 
¶8 In October 1996, fighting broke out in what has become known as the First Congo 
War.34  Laurent Kabila, head of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
the Congo (AFDL), in cooperation with Rwandan and Ugandan forces, invaded Zaire and 
ousted Mobutu. 35  In May 1997, Kabila declared himself president of the country that he 
renamed as the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  He retained his support from 
Rwanda.36  However, that relationship lasted only briefly. 
                                                 
22 Hum. Rts. Watch, supra  note 2, at 13. 
23 Id. 
24 U.S. Dep’t. of State, supra  note 21.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Hum. Rts. Watch, supra  note 2, at 13. 
28 Id. at 14. 
29 U.S. Dep’t. of State, supra  note 21.  The name “Zaire” derives from a Portuguese corruption of the word 
Nzere, the name for the Congo River in the languages spoken along its banks, translating as “the river that 
swallows all rivers.”  HOCHSCHILD, supra  note 21, at 54 n.54. 
30 U.S. Dep’t. of State, supra  note 21. 
31 Hum. Rts. Watch, supra  note 2, at 14. 
32 Fatal Transactions, supra  note 15, at 5. 
33 Edmund Sanders, Where Others Mined Wealth, Congo Villagers Scrape Living, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 
2005 (“At the bottom of the deep pit are gray dolerite rocks containing tiny flecks of gold.  Broken rocks 
are tossed up the same line of men and carried to a tent, where another row of workers pulverizes the stones 
by striking them with steel poles.  To pass the time and make the work less monotonous, the laborers pound 
and sing in a rhythm that can be heard a mile away”). 
34 Hum. Rts. Watch, supra  note 2, at 12; U.S. Dep’t. of State, supra  note 21. 
35 Hum. Rts. Watch, supra  note 2, at 12; U.S. Dep’t. of State, supra  note 21. 
36 U.S. Dep’t. of State, supra  note 21. 
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¶9 In July 1998, Kabila attempted to oust his Rwandan backers in what has become 
known as the Second Congo War.37  On August 2, 1998, Rwandan and Ugandan forces 
entered the DRC.  Kabila’s government gained the support of neighboring Angolan, 
Zimbabwean, and Namibian forces, which fended off the Rwandan/Ugandan front.  
Eventually, the Rwandan forces retreated but gained de facto control over parts of the 
eastern DRC with the rebel group Congolese Rally for Democracy (RDC).  In a similar 
move Ugandan forces backed the rebel group Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) to 
gain control of the northern third of the DRC.38  These wars resulted in the deaths of 3.5 
million people, many from exposure, hunger, or lack of medical assistance.39 
C. Attempts at Peace 
¶10 In August 1999, all parties taking part in the conflict in the DRC signed the Lusaka 
Accord.40  This first attempt at a peace settlement involved several components, 
including: a cease-fire; the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation called the UN 
Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC); the withdrawal of foreign troops; and an 
Inter-Congolese dialogue with the goal of forming a transitional government.41  The 
parties failed to fully implement these provisions. 
¶11 On January 16, 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated, and his son, Joseph Kabila, 
replaced him as president.42  From 2002-03, the foreign troops were removed from the 
DRC.  On December 17, 2002, the country negotiated an all- inclusive power-sharing 
agreement with the rebel forces and the central government.  On June 30, 2003, President 
Kabila announced the formation of a new transitional government.  However, ongoing 
violence and armed conflict continued to occur in the eastern part of the DRC.43 
¶12 The new Congolese Parliament convened for the first time on August 22, 2003.44  
On December 18, 2005, eighty percent of Congolese voters accepted a draft Constitution 
in a country-wide referendum.45  Reportedly, however, the East remained lawless; days 
after the referendum, UN and Congolese soldiers attacked militiamen in Ituri. 46   
¶13 Kabila faced opposition leader Jean-Pierre Bemba and thirty-one others in a 
presidential election on July 30, 2006.47  Since no candidate obtained a majority of the 
popular vote,48 a run-off election between Kabila, who had the most votes, and Bemba, 
the runner-up, was held October 29, 2006.49  Kabila won the run-off election with fifty-
eight percent of the vote.  Bemba challenged the result, claiming election fraud and other 
                                                 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Hum. Rts. Watch, supra  note 2, at 12. 




44 Report of the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1027 (October 23, 2003) 
[hereinafter U.N. Panel of Experts 2003 Report]. 
45 A giant leap forward , THE ECONOMIST , Jan. 7, 2006, at 49. 
46 Id. 
47 Edmund Sanders, Congo Plans Runoff Vote for October, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 21, 2006. 
48 Id. 
49 Eoin Young, DRC Supreme Court Confirms J. Kabila as President, MONUC.ORG, Nov. 27, 2006, 
http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=13260. 
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irregularities.  On November 27, 2006, the DRC Supreme Court confirmed Kabila as the 
winner of the election. 50 
D. The Fight for Gold in the Ituri District after the Congolese Wars 
¶14 The withdrawal of foreign troops in 2002-03 led to a battle between local armed 
groups contending for control of the gold mining areas.51  The armed groups drew the 
battle lines along ethnic lines; locals of the Hema tribe sided with the Union of Congolese 
Patriots (UPC), while those of the Lendu tribe sided with the Nationalist and 
Integrationist Front (FNI).52  Rwanda and Uganda directly and indirectly supported these 
rebel groups, shifting their alliances depending on circumstances.  The common uniting 
factor among all conflicting factions was to control the gold in the area.53  Control of the 
gold ensured that the warring factions would have the means for buying guns and 
carrying on the conflict.54 
¶15 In April 2003, dialogues chaired by the UN led to the formation of the Ituri Interim 
Administration (IIA), but this body proved ineffective.55  In May 2003, the armed groups, 
under pressure from the national government and MONUC, made an empty pledge to 
support the peace process, and fighting continued.56  Even as the new Congolese 
Parliament met on August 22, 2003, “that period also witnessed intensified fighting… 
notably in the Ituri District.”57  In June 2004, the IIA dissolved, and the nationa l 
government restored local administrative structures.58  The national government 
appointed administrators who had no connection to the armed groups and were unable to 
exercise control over the armed groups.  In January 2005, six leaders of the Ituri armed 
groups became generals in the Congolese army after a presidential decree in late 2004.59 
E. Account of Specific Atrocities Related to Gold Mining in Ituri Starting in Early 2003 
¶16 In early 2003, AngloGold Ashanti started discussing its gold mining exploration 
plans for the Ituri District with the transitional government of the DRC.  Around the same 
time, the FNI, the armed group associated with the Lendu tribe and supported by Uganda, 
sought to gain control of the gold-mining town of Mongbwalu in Ituri from the rival 
Hema-affiliated UPC.60  From March to May 2003, the FNI committed a massacre at 
Kilo, en route to Mongbwalu, killing at least 100 civilians presumed to be of Nyali 
ethnicity whom the FNI accused of helping the rival Hema ethnic group.61  Ugandan 
                                                 
50 Id. 
51 Hum. Rts. Watch, supra  note 2, at 20. 
52 Id. at 10. 




57 U.N. Panel of Experts 2003 Report, supra  note 44, at ¶ 44. 
58 Hum. Rts. Watch, supra  note 2, at 22. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 35. 
61 Id. (The NGO Human Rights Watch conducted six research missions to Africa and Europe in 2004 and 
2005 in preparing its report, entitled The Curse of Gold, regarding the human rights situation related to gold 
mining in the northeast Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).   Researchers interviewed several 
victims and witnesses in the DRC.  Id. at 9.  The accounts of human rights abuses mentioned in this section 
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forces supported the FNI combatants,62 and on March 13, 2003, the joint force reached 
Mongbwalu and set up a military camp under the command of the Ugandan army. 63 
¶17 On May 1, 2003, the Ugandan army withdrew and handed over control of 
Mongbwalu to the FNI.64  On May 12, 2003, in Mongbwalu, FNI combatants shot and 
killed two MONUC observers who were attempting to evacuate the area.65 
¶18 On June 10, 2003, the rival UPC retook Mongbwalu, commencing what has 
become known as the “48 Hour War,” lasting until June 12, 2003.66  The FNI then pushed 
back the UPC, using weapons left behind by the Ugandan soldiers who had departed in 
May.  The warring factions killed an estimated 500 people, many of whom were 
civilians. 
¶19 From July to September 2003, FNI combatants attacked several Hema villages to 
the east of Mongbwalu, killing scores of civilians and forcing thousands to flee.67  From 
June 2003 to April 2004, FNI combatants conducted “witch hunts” for Hema women and 
for those accused of protecting the Hema.68  They held “Godza ceremonies,” in which 
they claimed the Lendu spirit Godza told them to kill the Hema women.  The FNI killed 
seventy civilians, whom the combatants accused of witchcraft, from at least seven 
towns.69 
¶20 The FNI’s tactics for controlling the gold involved forced labor.  The FNI 
organized forced community labor known as “salongo,” initially requiring two full days a 
week, though eventually reducing the requirement to once a week for three hours.70  The 
FNI enforced salongo by arbitrary beatings, arrests, fines, or even death. 71  The FNI took 
control of the gold mines in Mongbwalu, charged artisanal miners a fee, and took gold 
from miners.72  The FNI used taxes from the mines to buy weapons and traded gold for 
weapons.73 
III. ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI’S (AGA’S) ACTIVITIES IN THE ITURI DISTRICT 
A. AngloGold Ashanti’s (AGA’s) Corporate Profile 
¶21 AngloGold Ashanti formed from the merger of AngloGold Limited and Ashanti 
Goldfields Limited, completed April 26, 2004.74  The company’s headquarters are located 
                                                                                                                                                 
are detailed more thoroughly in the Human Rights Watch report, and come directly from first-hand 
accounts of victims and witnesses .) 
62 Id. at 35.  While the Ugandan forces attempted to limit FNI abuses, “they neither disarmed the 
combatants nor ended their military alliance with them.”  Id. at 37. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 44. 
66 Id. at 38. 
67 Id. at 40. 
68 Id. at 41. 
69 Id. at 42. 
70 Id. at 46, 48. 
71 Id. at 48. 
72 Id. at 49. 
73 Id. at 52-53. 
74 AngloGold Ashanti Corporate Fact Sheet 2004, 
http://www.anglogoldashanti.com/NR/rdonlyres/CAF704E0-DB15-4DE5-833F-
9C26ACA999BA/0/AGACorporate.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
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in Johannesburg, South Africa.  With operations on four continents, including Africa, 
North America, South America, and Australia, the company employs more than 60,000 
people, including permanent employees and contractors.  Anglo American (AA), a 
British diversified mining company, effectively has a fifty-one percent interest in the 
independently managed AngloGold Ashanti, though Anglo American has appointed 
Goldman Sachs to sell AGA. 75  AngloGold Ashanti is a power player in the global gold 
mining industry; the company is Africa’s foremost gold producer, and one of the world’s 
leading resources companies.76  AGA’s corporate values state that the company “strive[s] 
to form partnerships with host communities, sharing their environments, traditions and 
values. [The company] want[s] the communities to be better off for AngloGold Ashanti's 
having been there.”77 
B. AGA’s History in the Northeast DRC 
¶22 In 1998, Ashanti Goldfields purchased a stake in a mining lease agreement with 
OKIMO, the DRC’s state-run mining office.78  The concession from OKIMO, known as 
Concession 40, covered over 8,000 square kilometers in the heart of Ituri with 
Mongbwalu at its center.79  After the merger of Ashanti Goldfields with AngloGold, the 
company now operates in the DRC through a subsidiary called AngloGold Ashanti Kilo 
(AGK), a joint venture between AngloGold Ashanti and OKIMO, which owns a 13.8% 
non-contributory share.80  The company currently considers its Ituri operation as a 
“Greenfields Explorations Area,” meaning it plans “to discover new mines in new 
areas.”81  In 2004, AGA spent $2 million on exploration activities in the DRC.82 
C. AGK’s Mine Exploration Activities in the Ituri District 
¶23 AGK started to lay the groundwork for its decision to start a mining exploration 
camp in Mongbwalu in 2003.  Early that year, the company held discussions with the 
transitional government, OKIMO, MONUC, and other parties with a view to 
                                                 
75 John Waples and Mark Kleinman, Anglo American Begins Huge Demerger, THE AUSTRALIAN TIMES, 
January 16, 2006, available at 
http://theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,17832216%255E643,00.html .  Anglo 
American’s fifty-one percent interest consists of a 41.8 percent direct interest, with the remainder held by 
Anglo South Africa Capital (Proprietary) Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of Anglo American.  Press 
Release, Anglo American, Completion of Offering of AngloGold Ashanti Ordinary Shares (Apr. 20, 2006).  
Anglo American has not yet sold its complete interest in AngloGold Ashanti, and some analysts speculate 
that buyers may look to dismember AGA.  Martin Creamer, Analysts Foresee Possible AngloGold Break -
up in $5bn Share Sale, MINING WEEKLY, Mar. 30, 2007, available at 
http://www.miningweekly.co.za/article.php?a_id=106095. 
76 AngloGold Ashanti Corporate Fact Sheet 2004, supra  note 74. 
77 AngloGold Ashanti: About Our Business Principles: Living Our Values, 
http://www.anglogoldashanti.com/Values (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
78 ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI, ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI’S ACTIVITIES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE 
CONGO 3, available at http://www.anglogoldashanti.com/NR/rdonlyres/A7AD9DFE-293B-4BF3-ADAF-
A6A9B4658F83/0/AGA_and_the_DRC.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
79 Hum. Rts. Watch, supra  note 2, at 57. 
80 ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI, supra  note 78, at 2. 
81 Anglogold Ashanti: Exploration, http://www.anglogoldashanti.com/About/Exploration.htm (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2007). 
82 Id. 
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commencing an exploration program in Mongbwalu.83  This timing is concurrent with the 
FNI massacre of civilians at Kilo.  By July 2003, several reports about the grave human 
rights abuses in the northeast DRC were publicly available.84  Steve Lenahan of AGA 
admits to knowing “that the FNI was one of many militia[s] that were accused of [human 
rights] atrocities.”85  Moreover, in July 2003, International Criminal Court Prosecutor 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo announced that he would follow the situation in Ituri as part of his 
investigation into alleged crimes in the DRC.86 
¶24  In October 2003, AGK representatives met again with transitional government 
officials to discuss intentions to start gold exploration drilling in Mongbwalu.87  In 
November 2003, the company sent two Congolese professional exploration employees to 
Mongbwalu to establish the infrastructure necessary for an exploration camp.88  In 
December 2004, AGA deployed an exploration team at Mongbwalu after discussions 
with DRC government officials and other parties.89  In January 2005, AGA commenced 
exploration drilling in Concession 40.90 
D. AGA’s Record of Corporate Social Responsibility 
1. Important Contributions to Sustainable Development 
¶25 AGA has made several important contributions to sustainable development in the 
northeast DRC.91  In 2004, AGA provided a local hospital in Mongbwalu with supplies of 
drugs, other consumables, and equipment, and replaced the hospital’s water pump and 
piping.  The company has provided equipment and supplies to schools, and has helped 
repair roads and a drainage system.  In May 2004, AGA helped maintain the Budana 
hydroelectric plant, serving towns in Ituri including Mongbwalu.  AGA has also provided 
assistance for local community events.92 
2. AGA’s Potential Link to Human Rights Atrocities 
¶26 Presumably, AngloGold Ashanti bears responsibility for the acts of its subsidiary, 
AngloGold Kilo.  People seeking to hold AGA responsible for the acts of AGK may have 
to determine whether AGK is a proxy for AGA under corporate or agency law principles.  
The remainder of this paper assumes AGA is liable for the acts of AGK. 
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i) AGK’s Interactions with the FNI 
¶27 Human Rights Watch alleges that AGK had to set up a relationship with the FNI, 
since the FNI maintained de facto control over mines in Ituri, despite AGK’s contract 
with and support from the transitional government.93  In late 2003 in the national capital 
in Kinshasa, AGK representatives met with FNI leader Floribert Njabu, who indicated his 
support for AGK to commence work in Mongbwalu.94  Later interactions included the 
visit of company representatives to Mongbwalu in November 2003, and February and 
March 2004, accompanied by FNI representatives who claim to have agreed to provide 
security to AGK.95  These visits to Mongbwalu occurred in the face of warnings against 
visiting the area from the administrator of the IIA and the head of the MONUC office in 
Bunia.96  AGA denies receiving a warning from MONUC.97  By March 2004, a company 
representative documented internally that he acknowledged that the FNI would allow the 
company to operate in the area.98  AGA knew about the FNI’s human rights violations,99 
as press and other reports were publicly available.100   
¶28 AGA claims that it did not establish a relationship with the FNI, and that any 
encounters with the FNI were unavoidable.101  Interestingly, Steve Lenahan of AngloGold 
Ashanti admits that AGA “had contacts with the FNI,” though in “the same way [the 
company] had contacts with MONUC and the [Congolese] government.”102  The FNI 
initiated “much of the contact,” not AGA, since the FNI “had an interest in trying to 
understand” what AGA was doing in Ituri.103 
ii) Specific Incidents with the FNI 
a) Funding to the FNI 
¶29 In January 2005, AGA paid the FNI $8000 to support a trip to Kinshasa.104  AGA 
claims it made the payment “under protest and duress” after FNI had threatened the 
safety of its staff and company assets.105  AGA admitted such payments were inconsistent 
with business principles.106  AGA closed down its operation in Ituri for seven weeks after 
this incident,107 and returned once MONUC had established its base in Mongbwalu.108   
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¶30 Additionally, from February to October 2004, AGA paid $1100 in freight landing 
taxes to the FNI.109  AGA claims it initially thought that the transitional government 
received these payments, based on the fact that the transitional government’s stamp 
appeared on some receipts.110  AGA stopped these payments when it became aware that 
the payments arguably contravened a UN arms embargo.111 
b) Transportation to the FNI 
¶31 AGA allegedly provided ground transport to FNI representatives, who often used 
AGA’s four-by-four vehicle.112  AGA claims the FNI’s use of its vehicle occurred under 
duress of threats of abuse and assault.113  Additionally, AGA allegedly provided the FNI 
with air transport, in that AGA permitted FNI representatives to travel on planes hired for 
flights leaving Mongbwalu. 114  However, AGA claims it had no formal arrangement with 
the FNI to provide transportation, and independent commercial charter airlines sold seats 
to anyone willing to pay, including FNI representatives.115 
c) Housing to the FNI 
¶32 FNI leader Njabu lived in a house on the AGK concession that was guarded by FNI 
combatants, some of them child soldiers, and was used as FNI headquarters.116  AGA 
confirmed that the FNI occupied several houses on the company’s property, but without 
AGA’s permission or approval.117  Further, AGA claims the FNI took occupation of some 
houses on the concession before AGK established its exploration camp.118 
d) Political clout to the FNI 
¶33 Few national politicians took interest in the FNI until AGA expressed its desire to 
start mining in Mongbwalu.119  A Congolese senator feared that the relationship between 
the FNI and AGA would strengthen the FNI politically, and was “dangerous.”120  Further, 
a decree from President Kabila integrated one of the FNI senior commanders, Gode 
Sukpa, as a general in the new Congolese army in January 2005. 
iii) Debate over the Timing of AGA’s Decision to Begin Mine Exploration Activities in 
Ituri 
¶34 Human Rights Watch has alleged that AGA should have waited until “a legitimate 
government authority” took charge before proceeding with its mine exploration activities, 
“rather than dealing with armed groups implicated in gross human rights violations.”121  
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AGA’s Steve Lenahan gave some credence to this view when he acknowledged the 
possibility that his company “got [its] timing wrong,” though he guardedly stated so since 
no guarantees existed that no other incidents with the FNI would have occurred if his 
company had waited for MONUC to actually establish a base.122  However, CEO Bobby 
Godsell does not agree that companies should stay out of the DRC until the democratic 
processes are firmly entrenched, claiming that “[t]he DRC government sees economic 
growth as an integral part of transformation and the African Union encourages it.”123  
Godsell notes that “[t]he crux of the matter is whether the development of a gold mine 
would be good or bad for the peace process in the DRC.”124  He answers that question in 
the affirmative, so long as his company does not “have to give succour to armed 
groups.”125   
¶35 Consistent with AGA’s analysis, many NGOs also recognize the importance that 
the private sector plays in contributing to sustainable development.126  MNCs influence 
government policy and practice, often with the aim of protecting their investments.127  
This influence may have the positive result of creating the stability necessary for 
sustainable development.  
E. AGA’s Current Plan for the DRC 
Following the deployment of the MONUC base in Mongbwalu, the 
signing of an agreement by the transitional government and armed militia 
groups in the regions, as well as its own detailed in loco investigations, 
AngloGold Ashanti has concluded that, under current circumstances, the 
company can continue to comply with its commercial and social 
responsibilities in the north eastern DRC with integrity. 128   
¶36 AGA will continue to fast-track exploration in 2007, and plans to conduct a 
feasibility study in 2008 that it hopes will allow it to commence construction of a mine in 
2009.129  In February 2006, OKIMO said that “AGA should accelerate its exploration 
plans in the DRC.”130 
¶37 Another mining company with interests in the Ituri region, Mvelaphanda Resources 
(Mvela) decided not to get involved in operations in Ituri after a strategic review of 
operations.131  However, AGA believes that it can continue to operate in Ituri with 
integrity. 132  Steve Lenahan insisted that “if… we make the judgment that it’s not possible 
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to do business there with integrity, we will leave the next day.”133  He also notes that even 
after the publication of the Human Rights Watch report, The Curse of Gold, in June 2005, 
“nobody, and this includes Human Rights Watch, told us to leave.”134   
¶38 The decision to operate in Ituri is one that the company will continuously 
monitor.135  CEO Bobby Godsell has pledged that “AngloGold Ashanti does not and will 
not support militia,”136 and has promised that “there should be no economic activity if we 
have to pay bribes.”137  Human Rights Watch has welcomed “AngloGold Ashanti’s 
commitment to suspend their operations if it requires supporting [armed] groups 
[implicated in gross human rights violations] in the future.”138 
¶39 In October 2005, AngloGold Ashanti agreed to renegotiate its contract with 
OKIMO.139  Okimo CEO Viktor Kasongo noted that he wanted to correct what the DRC 
government deemed an “imbalance of interests.”140  In March 2007, the DRC mines 
minister, Martin Kabwelulu, announced plans to review the AGA contract, which AGA 
supports.141  
¶40 The Lutundula Parliamentary Commission Report, released in February 2006, calls 
for the renegotiation of the mining convention between OKIMO and AGA in order to 
readjust the shares of participation in the partnership.142  Further, the report orders the 
suspension of mining activities in the OKIMO concessions because mining companies 
must cooperate with the militiamen to do business.143  The report is the product of the 
Lutundula Commission, a special DRC National Assembly commission led by 
parliamentarian Christophe Lutundula, charged with investiga ting mining and other 
business contracts that rebels and government authorities signed between 1996 and 2003 
during the Congo wars.  The report, initially submitted to the National Assembly in June 
2005, found that “dozens of contracts are either illegal or of limited value for the 
development of the country and it recommends their termination or renegotiation. ”144  
Further, the report calls for judicial action against several senior political and corporate 
actors involved in these operations,145 though the report does not implicate any officials 
from AngloGold Ashanti. 146 
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F. Summary of AGA’s Potential Link to Human Rights Abuses 
¶41 From early 2003 to the present, the FNI has killed civilians and used forced labor in 
its attempt to control the gold mining trade in Ituri.  Concurrently, AngloGold Ashanti 
has engaged in mine exploration activities in the area.  The two groups have interacted, 
meeting several times in 2003 and 2004.  AGA claims that all contacts with the FNI were 
unavoidable; the FNI, on the other hand, claims that AGA sought its permission to 
operate in Ituri.  AGA claims that any money or other support it gave to the FNI was 
either under duress or without AGA’s permission, and the company made any such 
decisions, though contrary to AGA’s policies, in the interest of protecting employees.  
However, AGA was aware of the FNI’s deplorable record on human rights, and perhaps 
should have realized that any contact with the FNI would give the armed militia implicit 
support.   
IV.  ANALYSIS OF NORMS CONCERNING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
A. Explanation of Norms 
1. Public International Norms and Provisions  
¶42 Several organizations have developed international norms and provisions that apply 
in the context of business and human rights.  These norms involve several different 
actors, including states, MNCs, and civil society organizations.  Many of these initiatives 
are voluntary, which to some extent helps to induce participation. 147 
i) Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
¶43 Participants to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (Voluntary 
Principles) “have developed [a] set of voluntary principles to guide Companies in 
maintaining the safety and security of their operations within an operating framework that 
ensures respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”148  The Voluntary 
Principles operate in the areas of risk assessment, public security, and private security.  
Participants include the governments of the US, the UK, the Netherlands, and Norway, 
companies in the extractive and energy industries, and human rights NGOs.149  Anglo 
American joined the Voluntary Principles in January 2005,150 and AGA claims that the 
Voluntary Principles guide its actions in the “context of the DRC and on the particular 
issue of operating in politically sensitive regions or areas of potential conflict.”151  Since 
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AngloGold Ashanti’s (AGA’s) activities do not involve public or private security matters, 
only the Risk Assessment principles are relevant to this analysis.   
¶44 The principles for Risk Assessment advise companies to consider several factors,152 
including:  
§ Potential for violence: “Risk assessments should examine patterns 
of violence in areas of Company operations,” which can be 
“limited to particular regions ;” 
§ Human rights records: “Risk assessments should consider the 
available human rights records of … paramilitaries,” and 
“[a]wareness of past abuses and allegations can help Companies to 
avoid recurrences as well as to promote accountability;” 
§ Rule of law: “Risk assessments should consider the local 
prosecuting authority and judiciary’s capacity to hold accountable 
those responsible for human rights abuses;” and 
§ Conflict analysis: Participating companies should “[i]dentif[y] and 
understand[ ] the root causes and nature of local conflicts, as well 
as the level of adherence to human rights and international 
humanitarian law standards by key actors” when developing 
strategies for managing relations with stakeholders. 
ii) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises 
¶45 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines) are recommendations of voluntary 
principles and standards for responsible business conduct addressed by governments to 
MNCs.153  Observance by enterprises is voluntary and not legally enforceable.154  The 
OECD Guidelines endorse policies that include respect for the human rights of those 
affected by company activities and abstention from any improper involvement in local 
political activities.155  The OECD Guidelines call for member states, through state-
appointed National Contact Points (NCPs), to investigate any allegations of violations of 
the Guidelines.156  While neither South Africa nor the DRC are OECD members, the 
United Kingdom, where Anglo American is based, is an OECD member.157  Further, the 
OECD Guidelines encourage NCPs to respond to specific instances from non-adhering 
countries.158 
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iii) UN Global Compact 
¶46 The UN Global Compact calls for collective action among governments, 
companies, and international labor and civil society organizations to promote responsible 
corporate citizenship.159  The Global Compact is a voluntary initiative.160  Principles apply 
to the areas of human rights, labor, the environment, and anti-corruption. 161  The human 
rights principles are:162  
§ Businesses should support and respect the protection of 
internationally proclaimed human rights within their sphere of 
influence; and 
§ Businesses should make sure they are not complicit in human 
rights abuses. 
AGA subscribes to the principles of the Global Compact.163 
iv) Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Guidelines 
¶47 “The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a multi-stakeholder process and 
independent institution whose mission is to develop and disseminate globally applicable 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines.” 164  Organizations subscribing to the GRI process 
voluntarily use the Guidelines to report on the economic, environmental, and social 
dimensions of their activities, products, and services.165  The social performance indicator 
focuses on human rights,166 and calls for qualitative data.167  Participants include 
representatives from business, accountancy, investment, environmental, human rights, 
research and labor organizations.168  GRI is an official collaborating center of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and works in cooperation with the UN Global 
Compact.169  AGA joined the GRI as an Organizational Stakeholder in September 
2004.170 
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v) International Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work 
¶48 The International Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work (Fundamental Principles) is a “commitment by 
governments, employers’ and workers’ organizations to uphold basic human values.”171  
The Fundamental Principles state that ILO members have an obligation to respect, to 
promote, and to realize principles concerning fundamental rights including freedom of 
association, collective bargaining, elimination of forced labor, abolition of child labor, 
and elimination of discrimination in employment.172  However, since the scope of the 
ILO’s mandate is limited to conditions arising out of the employment relationship,173 the 
Fundamental Principles are not relevant to AGA’s activities in the DRC. 
vi) UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms) 
¶49 The UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms) reaffirm that 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises have human rights obligations 
and responsibilities.174  Transnational corporations have general obligations, within their 
sphere of activity and influence, “to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure 
respect of and protect human rights.”175  The UN Norms derive their obligations from 
standards that apply to corporate activity, including international human rights 
instruments, binding conventions, and charters.176 
¶50 The implementation mechanism calls for corporations to create and implement 
internal policies that comply with the UN Norms.177  The UN and other appropriate 
organizations may independently review corporate activities,178 while states should 
establish the legal and administrative framework to support implementation. 179  The UN 
Norms require companies found to be in violation to pay reparations to affected parties, 
as assessed by national courts or international tribunals.180 
¶51 Steve Lenahan of AGA claims that the UN Norms are a set of principles that have 
no validity and have not been ratified by anybody. 181  He might not be alone in his 
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analysis.  Though the UN Commission on Human Rights passed a 2005 resolution that 
appointed a special representative to “identify and clarify standards of corporate 
responsibility and accountability,” in accord with the Commission’s implicit recognition 
of the UN Norms,182 the United States, Australia, and South Africa, opposed it.183  The 
United States feared that “an anti-business agenda would hold back economic and social 
advancement in developing nations and claimed that the resolution was formulated in a 
negative tone towards business.”184 
2. Extractive Industry Norms 
¶52 In his Plenary Remarks at the World Mines Ministries Forum in Toronto, Canada, 
on March 3, 2006, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Business and 
Human Rights, John Ruggie, observed that “fragments of collaborative governance are 
emerging in a variety of areas, specifically tailored for their characteristic dilemma 
situations.”185  However, he also warned that “these arrangements have weaknesses,” one 
of which is that “most choose their own definitions and standards of human rights,” a 
choice informed as much by “what is politically acceptable within and among the 
participating entities than with objective human rights needs.”186  Ruggie was likely 
referring to the extractive industry, which has developed its own standards regarding 
human rights norms.   
i) International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) Principles 
¶53 Starting in May 2003, the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) has 
encouraged corporate members to measure their performance against ten sustainable 
development principles.187  The third principle is to “[u]phold fundamental human rights 
and respect cultures, customs and values in dealings with employees and others who are 
affected by [member] activities.”188  Under this principle the ICMM advises companies to 
“[r]espect the culture and heritage of local communities” and to avoid the use of forced 
labor.189  ICMM members commit to report their human rights performance against the 
ICMM Principles in accord with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Mining and 
Metals Sector Supplement and the 2002 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines.190  The 
ICMM launched a pilot assurance procedure in May 2006 to provide independent 
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assurance that members are meeting their commitments.191  AGA CEO Bobby Godsell 
serves on the ICMM Executive Committee.192 
ii) International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions 
(ICEM) Agreement with AngloGold Ltd. 
¶54 On September 13, 2002, AngloGold CEO Bobby Godsell signed an agreement with 
the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions 
(ICEM), applicable to all AngloGold mines worldwide.193  The parties agreed to promote 
both “universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all” and “good relationships with local communities.”194  The Agreement, effective once 
signed “unless otherwise agreed or amended,”195 pledged to implement a sub-committee 
“to consider plans and proposals placed before it by either party following any alleged 
breach of accepted standards of conduct that could not be resolved at the level of local 
and national operation.”196 
iii) Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
¶55 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) “supports improved 
governance in resource-rich countries through the full publication and verification of 
company payments and government revenues from oil, gas and mining.”197  “The EITI is 
a multi-stakeholder initiative, with partners from governments, international 
organizations, companies, NGOs, investors, and business and industrial organizations.”198  
The EITI Principles call for greater transparency and accountability in payments and 
revenues through disclosure by companies and governments.199  The EITI Criteria include 
regular publication of payments by companies to governments and revenues received by 
governments from companies, and independent audits reconciling the payments and 
revenues.200 
¶56 On November 18, 2005, DRC President Kabila signed a decree that set up a 
committee to implement the EITI principles and criteria.201  Anglo American endorsed 
the EITI at its launch in Johannesburg at the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
in 2002.202  AngloGoldAshanti, as an independently managed subsidiary of Anglo 
                                                 
191 ICMM SD Framework: Independent Assurance, http://www.icmm.com/sd_verification.php (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2007).  The ICMM expect its Council to approve the pilot program in October 2007. 
192 ICMM Council Members, http://www.icmm.com/about_council.php (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
193 News Release, Int’l. Fed’n. of Chem., Energy, Mine, & Gen. Workers’ Unions [ICEM], AngloGold 
Signs Global Agreement: First in Mining Sector, Africa (Sep. 13, 2002), available at  
http://www.icem.org/?&id=25&doc=1000&fullpage=ok. 
194 Global Agreement between AngloGold Ltd. & ICEM on the Promotion and Implementation of Good 
Human and Industrial Relations in AngloGold Operations Worldwide, § 3, Sep. 13, 2002 [hereinafter 
AngloGold-ICEM Agreement]. 
195 Id. at § 5.2. 
196 Id. at § 4.1. 
197 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative [EITI], About EITI, 
http://www.eitransparency.org/section/abouteiti (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
198 EITI Home Page, Participants, http://www.eitransparency.org/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
199 EITI, supra  note 197. 
200 Id. 
201 EITI, Countries: Democratic Republic of Congo, 
http://www.eitransparency.org/section/countries/_democraticrepublicofcongo (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
202 Anglo American: Corporate Responsibility: International Commitments: Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, http://www.angloamerican.co.uk/article/?afw_source_key=F5C1CDD7-EA6E-
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American, is involved in EITI processes in Ghana, Guinea, and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo.203 
iv) The New DRC Mining Code 
¶57 The DRC government drafted a new Mining Code in 2003 in conjunction with the 
World Bank.204  The Code aims to facilitate privatization and international investment, 
while reserving artisanal mining for Congolese nationals only. 205 
B. Evaluation of AngloGold Ashanti’s Activities in the DRC Compared to the Norms 
Concerning Corporate Responsibility and Accountability for Human Rights Violations 
1. Public International Law Norms and Provisions 
i) Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (Voluntary Principles) 
¶58 AngloGold Ashanti’s actions appear to violate the Risk Assessment Principles of 
the Voluntary Principles.  AGA appears to have failed to consider both the violence in the 
Ituri area and the deplorable human rights record of the FNI armed group, and neglected 
to determine the root causes of the local conflict.  The initial participants of the Voluntary 
Principles met to discuss “concerns about whether companies should be operating at all 
in certain countries with deplorable human rights record [sic].”206  Therefore, if AGA 
were truly adhering to the purpose of the Voluntary Principles, they might have made the 
decision not to begin exploration activities in Ituri.  The Voluntary Principles, by 
incorporating UN instruments that codify international human rights norms, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, subject companies to those norms and treaty 
obligations.207  But, to the extent that a company’s individual contracts do not reference 
the Voluntary Principles, which would render them legally binding, the Voluntary 
Principles may merely be hortatory for that company. 208  AGA has not updated its 
contract with OKIMO, which dates back to 1998, since it started following the Voluntary 
Principles in 2005.  Further, no mechanism for third-party monitoring of implementation 
of the Voluntary Principles exists, so this approach is unlikely to be effective.209 
ii) OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
¶59 The UN Panel of Experts Report on Illegal Resource Exploitation in the DRC 
concluded in October 2002 that the activities of Ashanti Goldfields (AG), AGA’s 
predecessor, in the DRC may have violated the OECD Guidelines, and included AG in a 
list of eighty-five companies which the panel considered in breach of the OECD 
                                                                                                                                                 
48B6-AD03-A780616BD6EE&xsl_menu_parent=/corporateresponsibilty/internationalcommitments/eiti/  
(last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
203 Id. 
204 S. African Dev. Cmty. [SADC] Review: DRC Mining Industry, 
http://www.sadcreview.com/country_profiles/drc/drc_mining.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
205 Helene La Roux, Turning Congo’s Mineral ‘Curse’ into a Rainbow of Hope, MINING WEEKLY, Sep. 16, 
2005. 
206 Cynthia Williams, Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft Law” in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L. L. & POL. 457, 477 (2004). 
207 Id. at 481. 
208 Id. at 482. 
209 Id. at 483. 
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Guidelines.210  This report does not give any indication as to what AG’s alleged violations 
of the Guidelines entail.211  AG’s response included a denial, stating that its record of 
activities was clean and that it should not have been named as a company in violation of 
the Guidelines.212  The UN Panel of Experts later concluded in its October 2003 final 
report that the issues with Ashanti Goldfields had been resolved and that no further action 
was needed, though it provided no information as to the context of the resolution. 213  
However, the 2003 report also maintained that a company’s status as “resolved” should 
not be seen as invalidating the earlier findings with regard to the activities of the named 
companies.214  The UN Security Council asked individual countries to follow up on Panel 
findings.215   
¶60 Whether AG’s activities directly violated the OECD Guidelines remains unclear.  
One can argue that dealing with the FNI was an improper foray into the local political 
situation, and that any dealing with the FNI indirectly and negatively impacted the human 
rights of local people.  However, MNCs are not required to adhere to the OECD 
Guidelines, and no sanctions apply to a company’s failure to adhere.216  Victims would 
have to first file a complaint with the appropriate NCP, whose determination on the issue 
would be final and not subject to appeal.217  This approach is unlikely to be effective 
based on the “resolved” status of the previous accusations of the UN Panel of Experts; 
however, AGA’s continued activities in the DRC since the 2003 report raise concerns 
about violations of the OECD Guidelines.218 
iii) UN Global Compact 
¶61 AGA’s activities appear to violate the spirit of the Global Compact, in that AGA’s 
choice to operate in the region has caused it to become indirectly linked to human rights 
violations.  The company has therefore failed to help protect human rights within its 
sphere of influence, and may even be complicit in abuses.  However, since the Global 
Compact relies more on moral persuasion than on legal norms, as evidenced by the 
deliberate lack of enforcement mechanisms, this approach is unlikely to be effective.219  
Corporations generally understand that their decision to support the principles of the 
Global Compact is an “aspirational commitment” that neither legally binds the company 
nor creates a duty toward third parties.220 
                                                 
210 Report of the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Annex III, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 (Oct. 16, 2002); see 
also  All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region [APPG], The OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and the DRC, 8 (2005). 
211 Hum. Rts. Watch, supra  note 2, at 121. 
212 Addendum to the Report of the U.N. Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Response No. 15, U.N. Doc. 
S/2002/1146/Add.1 (June 20, 2003). 
213 U.N. Panel of Experts Report, supra  note 44, at Annex I. 
214 Id. at ¶ 23. 
215 APPG, supra  note 210, at 8. 
216 Choudhury, supra  note 147, at 64. 
217 Id. 
218 Hum. Rts. Watch, supra  note 2, at 76. 
219 Bunn, supra  note 126, at 1283. 
220 Halina Ward, The Interface between Globalisation, Corporate Responsibility, and the Legal Profession, 
1 U. ST . THOMAS L.J. 813, 831 (2004). 
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iv) Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Guidelines 
¶62 The GRI Guidelines are a reporting mechanism, so AGA is unlikely to be in 
violation of them. 
v) UN Norms 
¶63 Again, AGA’s activities appear to violate the spirit of the UN Norms, in that the 
company has not done everything in its power to promote human rights within its sphere 
of activity and influence.  However, the implementation mechanism of the UN Norms is 
weak, lacking specificity as to which international and domestic actors will play a 
monitoring role.221  Further, the UN Norms provide no guidance as to procedural and 
jurisdictional issues, such as which courts may assess damages, how they should do so, 
and which court’s rules apply. 222  Additionally, the UN Norms have no legal standing. 223  
While this approach may be ineffective, “the [UN] Norms’ legalistic nature and proposed 
enforcement mechanism result in a vast improvement over other codes of conduct.”224 
2. Extractive Industry Norms 
i) ICMM 
¶64 While AGA has not used forced labor, which the ICMM principles denigrate, the 
company did not take action to prevent the use of forced labor by the FNI.  Though the 
extent of the commitment to uphold fundamental human rights may be disputed, AGA 
arguably violated that commitment by failing to take action to prevent FNI abuses.  
However, since procedures for compliance with the ICMM Principles are in a pilot phase 
as of this writing, the ICMM may not be able to hold a member accountable for violating 
these principles.  
ii) ICEM Agreement with AngloGold Limited 
¶65 While some unions have put the ICEM Agreement with AngloGold “to the test,”225 
whether the parties have created the sub-committee they pledged to implement in the 
Agreement is unclear.  Nothing in the Agreement explicitly prevents the local community 
in Ituri from attempting to hold AGA responsible for its activities in the DRC, despite the 
limitation that the Agreement “apply to operations, wherever situated, over which 
AngloGold has direct managerial control. ”226  The local community members would 
likely have to file a complaint with both the ICEM and with high-ranking AngloGold 
Ashanti officials to achieve any result. 
                                                 
221 Choudhury, supra  note 147, at 66. 
222 Id. at 66-67. 
223 Bunn, supra  note 167, at 1285. 
224 Choudhury, supra  note 147, at 67. 
225 GINO GOVENDER, ICEM, GLOBAL MINING, GLOBAL CHALLENGES, GLOBAL UNION ACTION: ICEM 2004 
WORLD CONFERENCE FOR THE MINING INDUSTRIES 39 (2004) (describing successful lobbying efforts by 
two unions to convince the CEO to allow union officials to have access to workers in Tanzania). 
226 AngloGold-ICEM Agreement, supra  note 194, at § 2 (emphasis added).  Essentially, the local Ituri 
community would argue that AngloGold Ashanti has direct managerial control over its subsidiary, 
AngloGold Kilo. 




¶66 The EITI merely regulates disclosure by a company, not the company’s behavior.227  
Moreover, the process is still being implemented in the DRC, and is thus an ineffective 
avenue for redress. 
iv) The New DRC Mining Code 
¶67 Viewed by some as a failure that is “little used and unknown in the country,” the 
new DRC Mining Code “is not evenly applied to new mining partners.”228  Other critics 
complain that the drafters designed the Code to attract new foreign investors while 
neglecting to support local industry. 229  Moreover, the codes are hardly applied, especially 
in the absence of the rule of law. 230  Thus, the new DRC Mining Code does not provide 
an effective avenue for redress. 
C. Analysis of Accountability 
¶68 In the end, the true measure of AGA’s accountability for its actions may lie in the 
realm of public opinion. 231  In light of the fact that AGA has decided to subscribe to 
several international norms, public opinion may be warranted in finding that AGA is 
disingenuous in its commitment to corporate social responsibility.  Perhaps “paying lip-
service to the idea of good corporate citizenship” is all AGA ever intended to achieve.232  
After all, AGA claims to commit to these international standards, yet gets involved in 
situations where it seeks to profit in a conflict zone like the northeast DRC marked by 
grave human rights abuses.   
¶69 However, AGA has made significant improvements to the infrastructure of 
Mongbwalu.  Further, Steve Lenahan fears that if AGA were to pull out of the DRC, his 
company would be replaced by less reputable gold mining companies who would not 
care about human rights.233  Sam Jonah, AngloGold Ashanti’s president at the time of the 
Human Rights Watch report, echoed Mr. Lenahan’s fears, warning that those wishing to 
keep their hands clean by advocating economic removal “may end up with far dirtier 
hands than [AngloGold Ashanti’s].”234  At the very least, public opinion must determine 
whether having a reputable gold mining company operate in the northeast DRC is the 
lesser of two evils. 
                                                 
227 Williams, supra  note 206, at 498. 
228 William Church, DRC Mining Sector a Disaster, RWANDA NEW TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, available at 
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230 Id. 
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233 Interview with Steve Lenahan, supra  note 1. 
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V. LEGAL APPROACHES TO HOLDING ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI ACCOUNTABLE FOR ITS 
ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE DRC 
A. Criminal Law Approaches 
1. International Criminal Court (ICC) 
¶70 The International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction over the crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.235  The ICC can only exercise its 
jurisdiction if: the state on whose territory the alleged violation took place is a party to 
the Rome statute; if the person the Court is investigating is a national of a state party to 
the Rome statute; or if a state that is a non-state party to the Rome statute has accepted 
the Court’s jurisdiction.236  Since the Court’s jurisdiction extends only to natural and not 
to legal persons,237 the ICC has no jurisdiction over corporations.238  The ICC might hold 
liable corporate officials in leadership positions,239 whom the corporation might then 
indemnify.240 
¶71 The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002,241 and the Court only has 
jurisdiction over crimes committed after the statute’s entry into force.242  The DRC is a 
state party to the Rome Statute.243  In July 2003, the Prosecutor of the ICC announced that 
he would closely follow the situation in the DRC.244  The Office of the Prosecutor then 
analyzed the situation in the DRC, with a focus on crimes committed in the Ituri 
region. 245  On April 19, 2004, the President of the DRC referred to the Prosecutor of the 
ICC “the situation of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed 
anywhere in the territory of the DRC since the entry into force of the Rome statute.”246  
The ICC opened an investigation of the DRC on June 23, 2004.247  The Prosecutor has not 
brought charges against corporate officials in this case. 
                                                 
235 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter Rome Statute], art. 5, § 1 (1998).  The 
Court will eventually have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once the ICC defines the crime. 
236 Rome Statute, art. 12, § 2. 
237 Rome Statute, art. 25, § 1. 
238 Choudhury, supra  note 147, at 58-59. 
239 Rome Statute, art. 25; see also  Michael Chertoff, The International Criminal Court Is Even Worse than 
Its Critics Have Said, WEEKLY STANDARD, Apr. 12/Apr. 19, 2004, available at  
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/956xhybq.asp (arguing against 
bringing corporate officials before the ICC). 
240 See Stephen Kabel, Comment, Our Business Is People (Even If It Kills Them): The Contribution of 
Multinational Enterprises to the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 12 TUL. J. INT’L. & 
COMP . L. 461, 483-84 (presenting arguments against prosecuting corporate officials based on shareholders’ 
rights issues). 
241 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_English.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
242 Rome Statute, art. 11, § 1. 
243 Participants to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty11.asp (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2007).  The DRC signed the Rome Statute on September 8, 2000, and ratified it on April 11, 2002. 
244 Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Apr. 19, 2004). 
245 Press Release, ICC, supra  note 86. 
246 Press Release, ICC, supra  note 244. 
247 Press Release, ICC, supra  note 86. 
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¶72 With regard to AngloGold Ashanti, the Prosecutor must determine whether he can 
bring charges within the jurisdiction of the Court against high level figures within AGA 
for acts committed in the DRC.  The Prosecutor could establish the Court’s jurisdiction 
on a territorial basis since the acts occurred in the DRC, a state party to the Rome Statute.  
However, the Prosecutor would have a more difficult time deciding that AGA’s actions 
meet the definition of one of the crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction.  First, the 
Prosecutor would have to allege that the FNI’s actions met the definition of one of the 
crimes under the statute.  The Prosecutor could conceivably argue that the FNI’s actions 
meet the definition of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, though the 
most likely argument is that the FNI’s actions constituted a crime against humanity 
because the FNI committed murder as part of a widespread attack against a civilian 
population. 248  Next, the Prosecutor would have to prove that AGA’s actions “aid[ed], 
abet[ted] or otherwise assist[ed]” the FNI in the commission of a crime contemplated by 
the statute.249  Alternatively, the Prosecutor would have to show that the high level 
officials of AGA had sufficient knowledge of both the FNI’s intention of committing 
crimes and of AGA’s actions in the DRC.250  Based on the facts known at this time, the 
Prosecutor would have difficulty in claiming a sufficient basis to bring charges against 
high level officials of AGA.  The connection between AGA and the FNI is likely too 
attenuated to meet the standard of aiding and abetting, and the high level officials would 
likely claim that they neither sanctioned nor had knowledge of AGK’s interaction with 
the FNI. 
2. Domestic DRC Criminal Law 
¶73 Though the DRC has passed its own anti-corruption law, an “ingrained culture” of 
corruption that permeated the country under the Mobutu regime persists.251  “Bribery is 
still routine,” despite its illegal status.252  Under these domestic conditions, pursuing 
AngloGold Ashanti in the DRC is unlikely to bear positive results, especia lly since the 
DRC state owns a share in the AGK joint venture.  However, whether the courts in the 
DRC would be willing and able to provide a forum for a meaningful prosecution is 
beyond the scope of this analysis.  That conclusion might impact the jurisdiction of the 
ICC, which, under the complementarity principle, can only exercise jurisdiction if 
territorial courts are not willing and able to provide a forum for a meaningful 
prosecution. 253 
3. South African Criminal Law 
¶74 The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, signed April 28, 2004, 
defines the general offence of corruption in South Africa, and includes an act in which 
any person gives money to any other person in order to act in a manner that amounts to 
                                                 
248 Rome Statute, arts. 6-8 (explaining the definitions of each crime over which the ICC has jurisdiction). 
249 Rome Statute, art. 25, § 3(c). 
250 Rome Statute, art. 25, § 3(d)(ii). 
251 U.S. Dep’t. of State, 2006 Investment Climate Statement, Democratic Republic of Congo, Corruption, 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2006/64000.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2006). 
252 Id. 
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Vol. 5:2] Brandon Prosansky 
261 
either the abuse of a position of authority or a breach of trust, or the violation of a legal 
duty or a set of rules.254  The Act provides extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of a 
corporation which allegedly meet the definition of corruption but that occurred outside 
South Africa, “regardless of whether or not the act constitutes an offence at the place of 
its commission.”255   
¶75  AGA’s actions in relation to the payments to the FNI appear to violate the letter 
of this law, though the countervailing terms of extortion and AGA’s public 
acknowledgement and explanation of these actions militate against pursuing 
accountability under this Act.  However, other criminal approaches in South Africa may 
exist.256 
                                                 
254 The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act of 2004 s. 3, available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2004/a12-04.pdf [hereinafter Corrupt Activities Act].  This section of 
the Act reads: 
General offence of corruption 
3. Any person who, directly or indirectly— 
(a) accepts or agrees or offers to accept any gratification from any other person, whether for the 
benefit of himself of herself or for the benefit of another person; or 
(b) gives or agrees or offers to give to any other person any gratification, whether for the benefit 
of that other person or for the benefit of another person, 
in order to act, personally or by influencing another person so to act, in a manner— 
(ii) that amounts to— 
(aa) the abuse of a position of authority; 
(bb) a breach of trust; or 
(cc) the violation of a legal duty or a set of rules 
is guilty of the offence of corruption. 
255 Corrupt Activities Act, s. 35.  This section of the Act reads: 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction 
35. (1) Even if the act alleged to constitute an offence under this Act occurred outside the 
Republic, a court of the Republic shall, regardless of whether or not the act constitutes an 
offence at the place of its commission, have jurisdiction in respect of that offence if the person to 
be charged— 
(a) is a citizen of the Republic; 
(b) is ordinarily arrested in the Republic; 
(c) was arrested in the territory of the Republic, or in its territorial waters or on board a ship or 
aircraft registered or required to be registered in the Republic at the tim the offence was 
committed; 
(d) is a company, incorporated or registered as such under any law, in the Republic; or 
(e) any body of persons, corporate or unincorporated, in the Republic. 
256 At the Inaugural Imbizo of the Department of Foreign Affairs on August 23, 2005, when asked what the 
South African government has done to act on the link between South African mining houses and fighting 
for power over resources in the DRC, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma  said the 
government had taken steps to “consider prosecuting [the] alleged violators.”  S. Afr. Dep’t of Foreign 
Affairs, Notes on the Address of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma , at the 
Inaugural Imbizo of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Jameson Hall, University of Cape Town, Aug. 23, 
2005, available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05083109151002.htm.  Perhaps South African 
government action is forthcoming. 
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4. United Kingdom Criminal Law 
¶76 In 2001, the UK Parliament amended its anti-corruption statutes to include acts of 
corruption or bribery carried out or conducted “in a country or territory outside the 
United Kingdom.”257  For acts of bribery and corruption committed outside the UK, the 
law applies to a UK national or a body incorporated under the law of the UK.258  
Proceedings for the offence may be taken in the UK.259  The Act defines the offence of 
corruption as “any common law offence of bribery,”260 or “the first two offences under 
section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906,” which refer to bribes obtained by or 
given to agents.261 
¶77  The UK would not be able to prosecute AngloGold Ashanti directly, since the 
company is not incorporated under the laws of the UK.  However, the UK could 
conceivably prosecute Anglo American, a UK corporation and a significant stakeholder 
of AGA.  The UK would have to prove that Anglo American is responsible for the acts of 
AGA as Anglo American’s subsidiary. 262  Further, the UK would have to prove that the 
FNI served as AGA’s agent, and that AGA’s payments to the FNI constituted bribes as 
defined by the first two offences under section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 
1906.  A court is unlikely to find that the FNI was AGA’s agent, since AGA had no 
formal contractual relationship and only limited interaction with the FNI.   
B. Civil Law Approaches 
1. Domestic DRC Civil Law 
¶78 A civil lawsuit against AGA in the DRC would encounter many of the same issues 
as a criminal lawsuit.  Again, whether domestic courts in the DRC are willing and able to 
hear a case against AGA is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
2. United Kingdom Civil Law 
¶79 The United Kingdom might be an especially valid choice of forum because Anglo 
American, which has a significant interest in AngloGold Ashanti, is incorporated and 
based there.  Principles of extraterritorial jurisdic tion require the defendant corporation to 
be an English company, or a foreign company that carries on business to a definite extent 
                                                 
257 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, pt. 12, § 108. 
258 Id. § 109(1)(a). 
259 Id. § 109(2)(b). 
260 Id. § 109(3)(a). 
261 Id. § 109(3)(c).  The first two offences listed under Section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 
are: “(1) If any agent corruptly accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, from any 
person, for himself or for any other person, any gift or consideration as an inducement or reward for doing 
or for bearing to do, or for having after the passing of this Act done or forborne to do, any act in relation to 
his principal's affairs or business, or for showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in 
relation to his principal's affairs or business; or 
If any person corruptly gives or agrees to give or offers any gift or consideration to any agent as an 
inducement or reward for doing or forbearing to do, or for having after the passing of this Act done or 
forborne to do, any act in relation to this principal's affairs or business, or for showing or forbearing to 
show favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal's affairs or business;” Prevention of 
Corruption Act, 1906, c. 34, § 1. 
262 See discussion infra at notes 258-61. 
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from premises based in England.263  Therefore, plaintiffs seeking to hold AGA 
accountable for human rights violations would have to bring a suit against Anglo 
American, as opposed to AGA, since AGA has no presence in the UK. 
¶80 Few cases in the international human rights context have addressed the extent of 
liability of a parent corporation for the acts of its subsidiary. 264  A plaint iff must convince 
the court to pierce the corporate veil that shields the parent company as a corporate 
shareholder from liability for the acts of its subsidiary. 265  While no set standard exists to 
guide the decision, courts will look to factors including undercapitalization of the 
subsidiary, failure to observe corporate formalities, or a high level of control over the 
subsidiary so that the subsidiary is essentially the parent company’s alter ego.266  
Plaintiffs bringing transnational human rights tort claims face a significant challenge in 
convincing a court to pierce the corporate veil.267  Plaintiffs bringing a suit to hold Anglo 
American liable for AGA’s acts in the DRC must convince the court that Anglo 
American’s interest in AGA amounted to sufficient control over AGA’s activities.  
Alternatively, plaintiffs may seek to hold Anglo American liable for the acts of AGA 
under agency principles, though the court would have to find that Anglo American 
exercised a significant amount of control over AGA. 268 
¶81 Plaintiffs in the UK can bring a civil claim under customary international law, 
which is part of English common law. 269  That claim must show state action unless it 
involves a violation of a jus cogens norm.270 
¶82 However, plaintiffs face several concerns when bringing a suit in the UK.  In the 
UK, the losing party pays for the costs of litigation, which may pose a strategic limit to 
the type of case that a plaintiff may bring. 271  Additionally, the UK grants extensive 
sovereign immunity that may attach to state agents.272 
¶83  Most of these considerations militate against bringing a suit in the UK against AA 
seeking to hold that company accountable for the acts of AGA in the DRC. 
3. United States Civil Law 
i) Jurisdictional Hurdles 
¶84 The United States has played host to the large majority of transnational human 
rights cases against corporations.273  Plaintiffs bringing civil suits against corporations 
under any statute in the United States face several preliminary hurdles on jurisdictional 
                                                 
263 JOSEPH, supra  note 5, at 113. 
264 Id. at 129. 
265 Id. at 130. 
266 Id. 
267 See id. at 131-32 (“Empirical studies have found that courts in the US, England, and Australia were less 
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in original). 
268 Id. at 132-33. 
269 Id. at 115. 
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and procedural grounds which courts may use to dismiss suits.274  First, courts must 
establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporation.  A court can establish 
personal jurisdiction when the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [a forum] 
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’”275  
¶85  A US court should have little difficulty exercising personal jurisdiction over 
AngloGold Ashanti.  First, AGA has operations in the US, for which it can reasonably 
expect to be haled into US courts.  A court will likely find that such a presence in the US 
constitutes at least “minimum contacts.”  Second, AGA is listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange,276 and its investor relations office in New York subjects AGA to New York 
jurisdiction. 277    
¶86 Another jurisdictional hurdle plaintiffs bringing a suit in the US face is the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens, which allows US courts to dismiss a case if the court decides 
that an alternative forum in another jurisdiction or country would best serve the public 
and private interests at stake.278  Courts give deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum, 
though resident plaintiffs receive greater deference than non-resident plaintiffs.279  Courts 
then apply a two-step test.280  First, the court will determine whether an adequate 
alternative forum is available.281  Alternative fora often include the state where the 
alleged abuses occurred or the state of the alien defendant’s place of incorporation. 282  
However, the issue of adequacy becomes paramount in transnational human rights cases, 
since governments of foreign fora are often implicated in such suits, raising concerns 
about corruption in the administration of justice.283  Second, the court weighs the public 
and private interests to determine the most convenient forum. 284 
¶87 Plaintiffs bringing a suit against AGA should argue that adjudication in the DRC is 
subject to corruption.  As for the alternative forum of South Africa, plaintiffs should 
argue that the court should defer to the plaintiff’s desire to litigate in the US; that 
traveling to either the US or South Africa is equally inconvenient to the plaintiffs; that the 
costs to AGA of litigating in the US as opposed to South Africa are not “excessively 
burdensome” in light of AGA’s vast resources;285 and that AGA should not be surprised 
by being haled into US courts based on the existence of company operations in the US.  
Plaintiffs should argue that the US interest in providing a forum for the enforcement of 
international human rights norms,286 especially in the DRC,287 outweighs any other public 
interest, such as flooding the courts.288 
                                                 
274 Id. at 83. 
275 International Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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¶88 When plaintiffs bring a suit in the US alleging some form of state action, they face 
additional jurisdictional hurdles related to foreign policy.  Some of these hurdles include: 
the act of state doctrine, in which a US court may dismiss a suit when it must adjudicate 
claims related to the official acts of a foreign state;289 the political question doctrine, in 
which a US court may dismiss a suit involving a non-justiciable political question; 290 and 
the international comity doctrine, in which a US court may dismiss a suit if it determines 
that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable based on the interests of a foreign state 
affected by the litigation. 291  These hurdles will likely play a diminished role in a suit 
against AngloGold Ashanti, especially since the US State Department has found that 
“serious human rights problems remain in the security services and justice system” in the 
DRC.292   
ii) Alien Tort Claims Act 
a) Current Status 
¶89 An increasing number of plaintiffs have attempted to use the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA) to hold multinational corporations liable for human rights abuses committed 
outside the United States.293  Though no plaintiffs have been successful against 
corporations in court,294 the specter of continuing litigation may cause some suits to settle 
out of court.295  The ATCA grants “[t]he district courts … original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”296  The majority of claims against corporations seek indirect 
liability based on the corporation’s link to a third party that committed the abuses.297  
¶90 Jurisdictional Requirements: Courts have interpreted the ATCA to impose certain 
jurisdictional requirements that a plaintiff must meet in bringing a suit.  One such 
requirement, stated directly in the statute, is that the plaintiff be an alien of the US.298  
Another requirement is that the tort complained of be in violation of customary 
international law norms, which is the modern term for “the law of nations.”299  Customary 
international laws arise from the “general and consistent practice of states [state practice] 
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation [opinio juris].”300  They are binding on 
                                                                                                                                                 
287 Democratic Republic of Congo Relief, Security and Democracy Promotion Act of 2005, S. 2125, 109th 
Cong. (2005) (“It is the policy of the United States . . . [to] hold accountable individuals, entities, and 
countries working to destabilize the country”). 
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291 Id. at 46-47. 
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all states except for those which have persistently objected to their application. 301  
Included within customary international law are jus cogens norms, which are binding on 
all states and are non-derogable in all circumstances.302  
¶91 Challenges to Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs seeking to hold corporations liable under the 
ATCA face several challenges.  First, they must convince the court that the norms that 
the defendant corporation violated are actionable.  The Supreme Court addressed the 
limitations of actionable norms under the ATCA in its decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain.303  Though the ATCA is “only jurisdictional,”304 federal courts may recognize 
causes of action based on violations of a “narrow class of international norms”305 with at 
least the same level of “definite content and acceptance among civilized nations” as those 
recognized when Congress first enacted the ATCA in 1789.306  This decision may 
influence courts to curtail their willingness to classify alleged violations as breaches of 
the law of nations.307   
¶92 Plaintiffs must also determine whether they need to show state action.  The 
requirement of state action reflects the reality that “[m]ost customary human rights norms 
apply only in the context of governmental action.”308  Only some human rights violations, 
namely genocide, certain war crimes, piracy, slavery, forced labor, and aircraft hijacking, 
are prohibited by the law of nations without state action. 309  To meet the state action 
requirement, plaintiffs in ATCA suits against corporations have attempted to show joint 
responsibility of the corporation and the state.310  Many US courts make this state action 
determination in a manner similar to that used in domestic civil rights cases brought 
under 42 U.S.C. §1983 that seek to establish private liability under the color of law. 311   
¶93 Finally, plaintiffs must define the standard of liability.  After Sosa, the source of 
this standard, whether international or domestic, remains unclear.   
¶94 International Standard – Aiding and Abetting: One commentator has noted that 
while the Sosa Court did not decide the issue of standard of liability,312 its requirement of 
narrowly defining actionable international norms suggests that the standard of liability 
should also come from the federal common law, while leaving open the possibility that 
this standard may derive from the law of nations.313   However, the defendant in Sosa was 
not a corporation.  Since Sosa does not foreclose the idea that corporations are indeed 
legitimate defendants in ATCA cases,314 other ATCA cases involving corporations may 
yet provide guidance.   
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¶95 One of the leading ATCA cases involving a corporation is Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 
in which a federal court applied an international criminal aiding and abetting standard to 
determine Unocal’s liability for its role in human rights abuses committed by the 
Myanmar military, which Unocal knew provided security for its natural gas pipeline 
project.315  The court derived this aiding and abetting standard from international criminal 
tribunals, rather than from domestic § 1983 standards to determine private actor 
liability.316  The court announced that a corporation could be held liable for providing 
“knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the 
perpetration of the crime.”317  One commentator counsels against applying the aiding and 
abetting standard since it is not well-established in federal common law, and would be an 
expansive interpretation of the ATCA in the face of Sosa’s requirement of a narrow 
one.318  Post-Sosa courts must decide whether the international aiding and abetting 
standard applies in ATCA litigation. 319 
¶96 Domestic Standards – Common Law Tort Principles: Courts may, and perhaps 
should, apply common law tort principles in determining the standard of liability of 
corporations in ATCA suits.320  Examples of these principles include agency, joint 
venture liability, reckless disregard, action in concert, and directing the conduct of 
another.321 
b) Applying ATCA to AngloGold Ashanti 
¶97 In this case, Congolese victims of human rights abuses in the Ituri District would 
have to initiate the ATCA suit in the US against AngloGold Ashanti.  They would also 
have to claim that AGA violated an actionable norm of international law.  Even limiting 
actionable norms to jus cogens violations,322 plaintiffs pleading forced labor should be 
successful on this front, especially since the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Unocal 
classified forced labor as a jus cogens violation. 323  Plaintiffs need not show state action 
for jus cogens violations.  However, for violations not included within jus cogens, 
plaintiffs would have to show state action.  One test used in domestic cases is the nexus 
test, which requires such a connection between the private actor and the state that one 
may treat the action of one as the action of the other.324  In this case, the relationship 
between AngloGold Ashanti and the DRC government appears to meet the nexus test 
based on the joint venture status of AngloGold Kilo.   
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¶98 However, one problem is that the FNI, not AngloGold Ashanti or the DRC state, 
committed the alleged human rights abuses.  Plaintiffs can make several arguments to 
attempt to overcome this hurdle.  First, they can claim that the DRC state and the FNI are 
essentially the same, in that the state’s failure to protect citizens against FNI abuses 
implicates the state in those abuses.  However, AGA may yet escape liability because 
joint venture partners are only liable for acts within the scope of the joint venture,325 and 
human rights abuses are outside that scope.  Additionally, plaintiffs may claim that AGA 
is linked to the FNI based on the specific incidents of interaction between the two 
organizations.  However, this link is likely too attenuated to withstand a motion to 
dismiss. 
iii) Torture Victims Protection Act 
a) Current Status 
¶99 The Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) provides a cause of action to 
US citizens or aliens for acts of torture or extra-judicial killings committed by individuals 
“under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.”326  Case law 
appears to support the notion that corporations as legal individuals are legitimate 
defendants in TVPA suits,327 and the legislative history does not mention an exemption 
for corporations from suits.328  The statute imposes a ten year statute of limitations,329 and 
requires plaintiffs to “exhaust adequate and available remedies in the place in which the 
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”330  Case law suggests that plaintiffs can plead 
that exhausting local remedies would be futile or dangerous, and some courts have placed 
the burden of proof on the defendant corporation to show that plaintiffs have failed to 
exhaust remedies.331 
b) Applying TVPA to AngloGold Ashanti 
¶100 While plaintiffs may be Congolese or American when bringing a suit under the 
TVPA against AngloGold Ashanti for torture or extra-judicial killing in the DRC, they 
must show state action.  Plaintiffs would have to bring the suit by 2014, and they should 
have little difficulty showing that exhausting local remedies would be futile or even 
dangerous.  However, as with the ATCA claim, the plaintiffs face a challenge in proving 
state action. 
iv) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) 
a) Current Status 
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¶101 Plaintiffs have claimed relief in several transnational human rights cases under the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute.332  The RICO statute 
provides a civil remedy to a person injured by an organization that commits or threatens 
racketeering activity, including murder, kidnapping, robbery, and extortion, more than 
once and in a way that affects interstate commerce.333  A defendant found liable under 
RICO may have to pay triple damages and the plaintiff’s legal costs.334  Courts will only 
exercise RICO jurisdiction over acts outside the US if the claim passes either an effects 
test, in which the acts have substantial effects within the US, or a conduct test, in which 
conduct within the US caused damages outside the US.335 
b) Applying RICO to AngloGold Ashanti 
¶102 A claim against AGA would fail both the effects test and the conduct test.  
Plaintiffs would have difficulty showing that AGA’s acts in the DRC had sufficient 
effects in the US, especially since AGA’s activities in the DRC were relegated to 
exploration and not commercial production. 336  Plaintiffs would similarly be unable to 
show that AGA’s conduct in the US was related to damages in the DRC.337   
v) Transitory Tort Litigation 
¶103 US state courts may extend jurisdiction over transitory torts, defined as torts for 
which “the tortfeasor’s wrongful acts create an obligation which follows him across 
national boundaries.”338  Additionally, US federal courts have jurisdiction to hear 
diversity suits between aliens and US citizens, including corporations, if the claim 
exceeds $75,000.339  Pursuing litigation based on a transitory tort theory may be 
especially helpful when customary international law will not recognize corporate liability 
without state action. 340  Plaintiffs bringing a transitory tort suit against AngloGold 
Ashanti face an uphill battle, since AGA is not directly responsible for human rights 
abuses in the DRC.  Plaintiffs would first have to show that AGA was vicariously liable 
for the acts of the FNI, or that AGA acted in concert with the FNI.341  Then, plaintiffs 
would have to show that AGA’s conduct either recklessly caused them harm or 
negligently caused them foreseeable harm. 342 
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4. Remedies: Precedents for Reparations 
i) Corporate Precedents 
¶104 Though most cases seeking to hold corporate actors accountable for transnational 
human rights abuses have not been successful, several cases suggest precedents for 
reparations.  In Aguinda v. Texaco, Ecuadorian and Peruvian citizens brought an ATCA 
claim seeking recovery for damages caused by Texaco’s alleged pollution of rainforests 
and rivers in Ecuador and Peru. 343  Though the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court’s dismissal of the suit on forum non conveniens grounds since Ecuador 
provided an adequate alternative forum,344 reports about the decision claim that the judge 
“promised to oversee enforcement of the Ecuadorian court's ruling.”345  Additionally, as 
part of the March 21, 2005, Unocal settlement, Unocal agreed to direct compensation of 
victims and the provision of funds to develop programs to improve living conditions, 
health care, and education. 346 
ii) State Precedents 
¶105 The victims of human rights abuses might choose an alternative strategy of 
implicating the DRC state for its failure to protect them from such abuses.  This approach 
might be a substitute for seeking to hold AngloGold Ashanti directly accountable.   
¶106 In 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), in the Velásquez 
Rodríguez Case, in which the complainants sought to hold the state of Honduras 
accountable for the disappearance of Angel Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez, declared 
that “[t]he State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights 
violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of 
violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, impose the 
appropriate punishment and ensure the victim adequate compensation.”347  More recently, 
the IACHR ordered the state of Guatemala to pay reparations in the form of 
compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages for its responsibility in 
connection with the extra- legal execution of Myrna Mack Chang and the subsequent 
cover-up of the execution. 348  In a case that may have repercussions for mining companies 
seeking to operate in indigenous communities, the IACHR required the state of 
Nicaragua to pay reparations for immaterial damages for its role in granting a logging 
concession on the land of an indigenous community without the community’s assent.349  
Referenda in Peru and Argentina subsequent to the Nicaragua decision rejected the 
proposal of Canadian companies to operate commercial mines based on environmental 
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concerns.350  These precedents suggest that Congolese victims of human rights abuses 
may be able to obtain reparations from the DRC state if they prove the DRC state failed 
to protect them. 
¶107 In 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights approved The Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law (Basic Principles and Guidelines), which “describe [UN member states’] obligations 
in cases of gross violations of international human rights law.”351  The Principles and 
Guidelines obligate states to provide victims with “[e]qual and effective access to 
justice,” and to make available to the victims “[a]dequate, effective and prompt 
reparation.”352 
¶108 Plaintiffs should argue that they are entitled to reparations for any judgment against 
AGA, based on the precedents in corporate suits.  Additionally, if plaintiffs seek to hold 
the DRC state accountable for failing to protect them from human rights abuses, they 
should rely on the IACHR precedents and the Basic Principles and Guidelines.  Plaintiffs 
may have to determine how to trace AngloGold Ashanti’s illicit gains for disgorgement, 
which is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
VI. ALTERNATIVE MANNERS OF HOLDING CORPORATIONS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR 
INVOLVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
¶109 This section presents alternative approaches that the international community may 
take to ensure corporate actors like AngloGold Ashanti do not become involved in human 
rights abuses in conflict areas like the northeast DRC.  These approaches require 
additional research.  
A. UN Security Council Involvement 
¶110 The UN Security Council arguably has power to effect change by banning the 
mining of gold in conflict zones such as the Ituri District of the DRC since it has “the 
authority to intervene, even in internal armed conflicts, to prevent further humanitarian 
crises.”353  Such an action would be similar to the Security Council’s call for a ban on the 
import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone.354 
¶111 Yet this solution, which will effectively mean that corporations from developed 
countries could not do business in the conflict zone, has the unintended effect of 
eliminating the benevolent, community-building acts that some corporations perform, and 
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of allowing less reputable companies which aren’t concerned with human rights to enter 
the area. 
B. Permanent UN Body to Monitor the Role of Business in Conflict Areas 
¶112 The UN Panel of Experts received criticism for its approach to investigating 
companies charged with violations of the OECD Guidelines for their operations in the 
DRC.355  However, that panel faced political pressures since it received its mandate from 
interested states, and was composed of non-permanent staff members.356  A more 
permanent UN body could fare better at monitoring the role of business in conflict zones.  
A permanent body would be able to develop constructive relationships with those 
charged with investigating alleged violations of international norms, such as the NCPs 
under the OECD Guidelines, and its procedures would be more transparent than those of 
an ad hoc panel. 357 
C. Adapting the Kimberley Process for Conflict Diamonds 
¶113 The Kimberley Process, an initiative supported jointly by governments, the 
international diamond industry, and civil society organizations with the aim of stopping 
the flow of conflict diamonds, implemented the voluntary Certification Scheme that 
requires participants to certify that conflict diamonds are not included in rough diamond 
shipments.358  The initiative includes participants that account for about 99.8% of the 
global production of rough diamonds.359  While the success of the initiative continues to 
be a source of debate,360 Bridgette Radebe, president of the South African Mining 
Development Association (SAMDA), has suggested that “the Kimberley Process to 
ensure diamonds are not fuelling conflict in Africa should be replicated to cover the 
whole mining sector and broadened to cover other areas like environmental destruction 
and corruption.”361  Adapting the Kimberley Process to the gold mining industry could 
serve as an important step in ensuring that gold does not come from conflict areas marked 
by human rights atrocities. 
D. Local Organization 
¶114 A “special gold monitoring body” involving all relevant actors, including 
representatives of international mining corporations, the DRC state, and civil society 
organizations, could monitor compliance with human rights standards, and seek to 
provide compensation for victims of human rights abuses related to gold mining.362 
                                                 
355 APPG, supra  note 210, at 20. 
356 Id. 
357 Id. 
358 The Kimberley Process Home Page, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/site/index.html (last visited Apr. 
13, 2007). 
359 Id. 
360 See Annie Wallis, Comment, Data Mining: Lessons from the Kimberley Process for the United Nations’ 
Development of Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations, 4 NW. U. J. INT’L. HUM. RTS. 388, 
*27-61 (analyzing the positive attributes and perceived flaws of the Kimberley Process). 
361 Eric Onstad, S. Africans Want Wider Ethical Code for Mining , THE MINING NEWS (Sep. 20, 2005), 
available at  http://www.theminingnews.org/news.cfm?newsID=1370. 
362 Hum. Rts. Watch, supra  note 2, at 6. 
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E. Strict Conditions on Foreign Aid to the DRC 
¶115 The international community may impose strict conditions for the disbursement of 
aid to the DRC.363  These strict conditions should include provisions that require the DRC 
state to regulate corporate activities to ensure corporations do not become involved, 
directly or indirectly, in human rights abuses. 
F. Guidelines for Operating in Conflict Zones 
¶116 In its recently published manual entitled Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: 
Guidance for Extractive Industries, International Alert, an NGO focused on 
peacebuilding, provides a set of tools for companies to improve their impact on host 
countries and minimize conflict risk.364  The manual provides background information 
about and strategies for addressing a variety of issues companies face in conflict zones, 
including dealing with armed groups and human rights.  The manual advises companies 
to perform due diligence assessments of the local human rights situation, 365 and provides 
analysis of the risks and rewards of engaging armed groups.366  Multinational companies 
choosing to operate in conflict zones should at the very least follow these guidelines. 
G. Home Government Action 
¶117 Home governments can play a more proactive role in policing companies operating 
outside of the home country’s borders.  Home countries can effectively enforce existing 
laws or pass new laws to hold companies accountable for their complicity in human 
rights abuses in host countries.  Stricter enforcement of home country laws would likely 
cause companies to more seriously consider the implications of their decision to operate 
in areas where human rights abuses are occurring.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
¶118 AngloGold Ashanti is one of the biggest gold-mining companies in the world.  
Based on its wealth, it has power to influence human rights on the African continent, and 
more specifically, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  The company continues to 
engage in gold-mining exploration activities in a region that faces instability. 367  
                                                 
363 François  Grignon, International Response to the Illegal Exploitation of Resources in the DRC, in 
CHALLENGES OF PEACE IMPLEMENTATION: THE UN MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 
43, 51 (Mark Malan & João Gomes Porto eds., 2004). 
364 International Alert: Publications: Business: Multinationals: Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: 
Guidance for Extractive Industries, http://www.international-alert.org/publications/234.php (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2007). 
365 International Alert, Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries, Section 4, 
Flashpoint Issue 8: Human Rights at 6. 
366 Id. at Section 4, Flashpoint Issue 6: Dealing with Armed Groups at 2-3. 
367 See Nina Yacoubian, W. Swing: We Are in the Process of Putting Another Plan in Place for Ituri, 
MONUC.ORG, Mar. 22, 2007, http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsId=14149.  Steve Lenahan, 
AngloGold Ashanti’s Executive Officer for Corporate Affairs, sees hope in that, since April 2005, “[a] 
democratically elected government and cabinet is in place, the institutions of national, regional and local 
government, while not complete, are being constructed, an integrated . . .  army has been established under 
the close scrutiny of MONUC and, very importantly, AngloGold Ashanti has been working with local 
communities, politicians, institutions of civil society and NGOs (including our most vocal critics) to 
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However, no effective international or domestic approach currently exists to hold the 
company accountable for that decision, which has indirectly caused the company to be 
associated with human rights abuses. 
¶119 The international community should address this problem and engage in serious 
discussions to develop an approach to ensuring that corporate actors do not become 
embroiled in human rights violations.  Only then can the northeast DRC, and other 
similarly situated areas, turn its natural resource “curse” into a blessing.368 
                                                                                                                                                 
promote a sustainable change in the quality of community life in the region.” E-mail Letter from Steve 
Lenahan, Executive Officer for Corporate Affairs, AngloGold Ashanti, to Brandon Prosansky, Author and 
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 1, 2007) (on file with author).  
368 Press Release, Global Witness, Recent Legislation Introduced in Senate on DRC (Dec. 19, 2005), 
available at  http://www.globalwitness.org/press_releases/display2.php?id=326. 
